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Much of the literature on critical thinking focuses on the ways in which human 
beings develop the capacity, through complex cognitive processes and skills, to 
evaluate or make sense of information. Within the formal educational context, 
it is often associated with pedagogical strategies aimed toward nurturing and 
developing learners’ capacity for logical enquiry and reasoning. Though such 
insights are clearly very important, a narrow focus on what might be termed 
the “science of learning” can result in a negation of an obvious but very important 
point, namely, to what end and for what purpose should we be seeking 
to nurture critical thinking. Put another way, what is the moral, ethical, and 
political dimension of learning to think critically? And it is this question that 
forms the main purpose of the present chapter. By invoking the idea of critical 
thinking as a social practice, we examine the educational approach known as 
critical pedagogy and consider its relevance to higher education today. Critical 
pedagogy in its broadest sense is an educational philosophy that seeks to connect 
forms of education to wider political questions by arguing that processes 
or acts of learning and knowing are themselves inherently political. 
 
Perhaps the most important figure that is associated with developing the 
tradition of critical pedagogy is the Brazilian educationalist Paulo Freire 
(1921–1997). In the introduction to his famous book Pedagogy of the Oppressed, 
Richard Shaull has summed up his approach when he argues that the starting 
point for Freire is that education can never be neutral; it either acts to socialize 
the learner into the “logic of the present system” or it becomes the “practice of 
freedom.” Freedom here is understood as the capacity of the learner to “deal 
critically and creatively with reality and discover how to participate in the 
transformation of their world” (Freire 1996, 16). In this sense Freire’s approach 
contains three key elements: the availability of education opportunities to the 
broad mass of people; the social and psychological processes that reinforce 
acts of educational inclusion/exclusion, both within and outside formal educational 
institutions; and the pedagogical strategies deployed by teachers. 
 
In line with a range of progressive thinkers from the Enlightenment onward, 
Freire believed that education needed to be made available to men and women 
from all strata of society, rather than just the social elite. But his most significant 
contribution concerns the “critical” element within “critical pedagogy” 
and the pedagogical practices he developed and then wrote about in his many 
books. He sought to embody a participatory egalitarianism on one hand, but at 
the same time to create a classroom in which students could think about their 
life and other people’s lives in a new and deeply critical way. For Freire, genuine 
criticality could not coexist within educational processes that were purely 
instrumental; hence the question of understanding the underlying purpose of 
teaching and knowing is a crucial starting point. We would argue that these 
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issues are still of crucial significance in talking about Freire’s relevance today, 
even though it must at the same time be acknowledged that the form in which 
higher educationis offered now has changed enormously since he was working 
in the field. We are currently living through a period in which higher education 
is being transformed from its older incarnation as an elite system serving 
the interests of a privileged few, to a massively expanded global system, which 
is drawing in hundreds of thousands of people across the world (Cowden and 
Singh 2013). 
 
The terrain of education today would have probably been unrecognizable 
to Freire, and given that one of his major attacks on conventional systems 
was directed at the way they excluded all but the wealthy, it could be argued 
by defenders of the present arrangements that the availability of education 
has been substantially democratized. There is no doubt that purely in terms 
of access, certainly in most developed countries, we do now have something 
resembling a mass higher education system (see, e.g., Usher and Medow 2014). 
Yet, ironically, at the same time universities have become much less democratic, 
both in relation to their internal management structures and their accountability. 
The reason for this is that the rationale for their expansion has not been 
concerned with the idea of education as a social good, but rather as a lucrative 
globally salable commodity. This approach has fundamentally reshaped both 
the form and the content of higher education. In a detailed analysis of the 
current and future consequences of this approach on the UK higher education 
(HE) titled Sold Out , the Oxford academic Stefan Collini concludes that a system 
with “a very good record” in terms of “universally acknowledged creativity, 
streets ahead of most of their international peers” and in being a positive 
force “for human development and social cohesion” (2013, 12) is being transformed 
in the image of the financial institutions that so spectacularly demonstrated 
their incompetence in the banking collapse of 2007–2008. In a similar 
vein, Andrew McGettigan (2013) in his forensic examination of the funding 
of UK universities argues that the introduction of large fees coupled with the 
transfer of funding from the state and direct taxation to private finance and 
loans systems is comparable to the “subprime” mortgage market, creating new 
classes of students with high levels of debt and “subprime degrees.” Moreover, 
this subordination of the university to the logic of finance capital poses serious 
challenges to the project of critial thinking. In this sense the need for an educational 
practice concerned with the liberation rather than the domestication 
of students is as great as it has ever been. 
 
Against the backdrop of the wider context of HE this chapter is centrally concerned 
with setting out the distinctive contribution of critical pedagogy to the 
broader question of critical thinking. Much of our focus is on the work of Paulo 
Freire, but of course his approach does not emerge in a vacuum. For this reason 
we begin the chapter by revisiting the ideas of key figures within the European 
Enlightenment; postmodernist claims to his legacy notwithstanding, we feel 
we need to be absolutely clear that Freire’s work stands on this legacy, though 
like Marx, one of his major influences, it was a legacy he both built on and 
challenged. We follow this with a discussion of a 1999 essay “Critical Thinking 
and Critical Pedagogy” by Nicholas Burbules and Rupert Berk that specifically 
compares critical pedagogy with other concepts of critical thinking. We conclude 
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the chapter with a discussion of the importance of critical pedagogy in 
the context of the current reshaping of relationships between students and 
teachers in a neoliberal market model, arguing that Freire’s work offers a framework 
for defending and expanding essential aspects of critical thinking that 
we regard as universal. 
 
Theorizing criticality—a historical perspective 
 
When we consider the history of the concept of “criticality,” it is clear that 
it is crucial not just for theorizing the basis of education, but it is also, in a 
wider sense, deeply connected with a capacity for expression within a wider 
“public sphere,” a space where ideas can be discussed and debated openly. The 
European Enlightenment, with its injunction that we “dare to know!” is crucial 
for initiating modern concepts of criticality. Immanuel Kant’s 1784 essay What 
Is Enlightenment? famously defined “enlightenment” as the “exit of humans 
from their self-incurred immaturity” (Fleischacker 2013, 13), and this represents 
the elevation of a concept of criticality based above all on Reason. For 
Kant, Reason was a universal human capacity, and hence he regarded its denial 
as a denial of our humanity itself. He defines “thinking for oneself” as “seeking 
the highest touchstone of truth in oneself (i.e. in one’s reason), and the maxim 
of always thinking for oneself is enlightenment ” (Kant 1998, 146–147). 
Reason in a Kantian framework is understood not just as a universal human 
capacity but as the capacity for critical engagement, which represents something 
much greater that the amount of information one possesses. “Becoming 
enlightened” involves liberating oneself at the level of thought and feeling, 
and Etienne Balibar has argued that “from Kant onwards . . . modern idealism is 
above all a theory of the active self-construction of the subject” (1994, xv). The 
corollary of this, Balibar argues, is the “autonomy of the political,” which he 
characterizes as “reminiscent of a long tradition in the definition of citizenship 
. . . namely the emergence of ‘we the people’ as a political subject” (1994, 
x). The Enlightenment definition of criticality was thus inherently political 
and social, and connected with concepts of popular sovereignty, democratic 
citizenship, and, in their absence, revolution. These ideas were of course crucial 
aspects of the intellectual background of the French, American, and the 
Haitian revolutions, and which continue to be important to this day. This 
relationship between the capacity to use reason in a public and critical way 
remains as true of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen as it was 
adopted in August 1789 by the French National Constituent Assembly, as it is 
of contemporary struggles for genuine popular representation manifest in the 
Arab Spring. 
 
But where does Reason come from? While the establishment of this principle 
was one of the most important legacies of the Enlightenment, Hegel’s 
major contribution to this was the idea that it had to be accompanied by the 
development of “critical self-consciousness.” As Pavlides (2010) argues, “Hegel 
attempted to demonstrate the active role which the human mind played in 
the evolution of civilization and, at the same time, he became aware of the 
contradictory essence of things as the moving force behind their transformation” 
(83). It was by historicizing critical self-consciousness through his use of 
the “dialectical” method that Hegel established “the principle whereby stable 
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thoughts reveal their inherent instability by turning into their opposites, and 
then into more complex thoughts” (Houlgate 2005, 38). In this way of thinking 
Hegel demonstrated the importance of going beyond either/or forms of 
logic, thus overturning the perception that “things and concepts [were] either 
one thing or the other” (Houlgate 2005, 39). Hegel’s approach radicalized criticality 
in the way it required a thinker to grasp “contradictions”—essential relationships 
between things that only appeared to be opposed to each other, but 
were, at a deeper level, essentially related. 
 
It has almost become a cliche to reiterate Marx’s claim to have turned the concept 
of the dialetic “on its head,” but as Cyril Smith has noted, it is more useful 
to think of Marx as taking the method Hegel used for understanding philosophical 
contradictions as a means of understanding real material contradictions; in 
other words, Marx was “looking for the way to ‘actualise philosophy’ . . . Where 
Hegel’s science sought to reconcile the conflicting forces of the modern world, 
Marx’s science sets out from the necessity to actualise those conflicts and bring 
them to fruition” (1996, 147). This is demonstrated by the way Marx approached 
the question of religious belief. In common with most Enlightenment philosophy 
since Kant, Marx perceived uncritical religious faith as a major barrier to 
enlightened thought and existence. However rather than see this faith simplyas 
an “illusion” and thereby illogical, Marx argued that it needed to be understood 
as the inverted expression of real social contradictions: 
Religious suffering is at one time the expression of real suffering and a protest 
against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of an oppressed creature, the 
heart of a heartless world and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium 
of the people. (1975, 244) 
Marx’s description of religion as the “opium of the people” has often been 
misunderstood to mean that he was simply dismissive of religion. Rather, he 
saw it an analogous to an opiate, in that it dulled the pain of people’s lives 
and allowed them to carry on, but without any fundamental change in the 
oppressive conditions in which they lived and worked. It was thus not the 
clarion calls for freethinking offered by Enlightenment philosophers that 
would undermine the appeal of religion, but “the abolition of religion as the 
illusory happiness of the people is the demand for their real happiness” (Marx 
1975, 244). After working extensively on his critique of Hegel in his early writings, 
Marx shifted his focus toward understanding “political economy” where 
the material causes of the denial of people’s humanity were to be found. This 
shift is captured in his eleventh thesis on Feuerbach: “the philosophers have 
interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it” (Marx 1975, 
423). This statement is remarkable for the way it encompasses criticality as a 
concept with inherently ethical, epistemological, and pedagogical dimensions, 
which themselves could only be realized through praxis, the unity of theory 
and practice. 
In the twentieth century, as educational institutions expanded, debates 
around the significance of criticality moved more and more into the space of 
pedagogical practice. While the American pragmatist philosopher and educational 
reformer John Dewey did not see himself as a revolutionary in the way 
Marx did, he was equally concerned with the social implications of pedagogical 
practices. As Amsler notes, for Dewey: 
[An] educator’s decisions about what, how, why and where to teach 
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can never be based on purely technical skill or theoretical knowledge.  
Instead they emerge from theorizing the particular form of democratic  
life, articulating the practical role that forms of education could play in 
this life” (Amsler 2013, 67).  
For Dewey education was not just about making a “good life,” but also an  
essential component of a deepening practice of “democracy”that was  
predicated on the capacity of people at large being equipped with the skills 
 to turn this into a reality. This is embodied in his oft-quoted statement  
that one should “cease conceiving of education as mere preparation for later  
life, and make it the full meaning of the present life” (Dewey 1916, 239). 
 
The same questions about the social role of pedagogy are important in the 
early work of social theorist J u rgen Habermas, particularly his 1962 book The 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1989). This work drew heavily on 
the pessimistic analysis of mass popular culture in the work of his Frankfurt 
School colleagues Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, but came to quite 
different conclusions. Returning to Kant’s discussion in What Is Enlightenment? 
Habermas argued that the milieu of salons, coffee houses, and independent 
journals, which formed the context into which Kant’s work was received, was 
very far from the context of the contemporary public sphere. He argued that this 
had developed primarily into a venue for entertainment where critical discussion 
was largely absent and social issues were framed in a language of “rational 
consensus” that was defined and dominated by powerful corporations and the 
simplistic slogans of political parties. As a result he argued that critical thinking 
had been “supplanted by manipulative publicity” (Habermas 1989, 178). 
In order to prevent a resurgence of the sort of authoritarianism represented 
by both Nazi Germany and the USSR under Stalin, Habermas advanced the 
idea of “communicative competence.” This concerned the capacity for a 
human subject to move beyond the dominant “rational consensus” and nurture 
a praxis whereby they could evaluate truth claims through a combination 
of reason, reflection, and critical thinking, thepurpose of which was to 
unveil hidden forms of domination. Habermas used the term “ideal-speech 
situations” to characterize this ongoing struggle for reflective understanding. 
In ideal-speech situations people were not told what to think, but had the 
opportunity to participate in a genuine interaction in which it was possible 
for them to independently evaluate their understandings and views on a particular 
issue. These ideas have had a major influence in contemporary discussions 
of the social role of universities and the place of pedagogy within them. 
Ron Barnett’s 1997 book Higher Education: A Critical Business is just one such 
discussion that develops a Habermasian defence of critical thinking in relation 
to HE in the UK. Barnett argues that it is not enough for university students 
to develop the capacity to reflect critically on knowledge; it is only through 
“critical reflection” and “critical action” that the learner can become a truly 
“critical being” capable of engaging “with the world and with themselves as 
well as with knowledge” (1997, 1). 
 
Critical thinking and critical pedagogy 
 
The far-from-exhaustive survey demonstrates just how central the relationship 
between ideas about criticality and a concept of “the public sphere” is, 
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and even if such conceptualizations didn’t explicitly articulate a pedagogical 
dimension, they certainly implied one. But what sort of pedagogy? This question 
is usefully explored by Nicholas Burbules and Rupert Berk’s 1999 essay 
 “Critical Thinking and Critical Pedagogy: Relations, Differences and Limits .” 
Their focus is a comparative analysis of the way the term “critical” functions 
within these two traditions of “critical thinking” and “critical pedagogy”: 
Each invokes the term “critical” as a valued educational goal: urging  
teachers to help students become more sceptical toward commonly  
accepted truisms.  Each says, in its own way, “Do not let yourself be  
deceived.” And each has sought to reach and influence particular groups  
of educators, at all levels of schooling, through workshops, lectures,  
and pedagogical texts. They share a passion and sense of urgency  
about the need for more critically oriented classrooms. Yet with  
very few exceptions these literatures do not discuss one another.  
Is this because they propose conflicting visions of what “critical” 
thought entails? Are their approaches to pedagogy incompatible?  
(Burbules and Berk 1999) 
They argue that both traditions deploy the term “critical” as characterized by 
the defence and expansion of spaces where students are able to reach independent 
judgments with regard to commonly accepted truth claims, and also 
argue for “a critical education [which] can increase freedom and enlarge the 
scope of human possibilities” (Burbules and Berk 1999, 46). But while critical 
thinking traditions focus on a concern with uncovering faulty arguments in 
logic, reasoning, and the use of evidence, critical pedagogy’s primary concern 
is “with social injustice and how to transform inequitable, undemocratic or 
oppressive institutions and social relations” (Ibid.). 
 
Burbules and Berk illustrate these differences using the example of research 
that purportedly demonstrates that African Americans are “less intelligent” 
than other ethnic groups, based on the fact that they score lower in IQ tests 
(1999, 54). Within the critical thinking tradition, concerns about whether such 
conclusions are justified would be addressed through methodological questions 
about the reliability of the instruments used to test intelligence; the validity 
of the findings; and the clarity of key terms, such as the concept of “intelligence.” 
For critical pedagogy, while the latter questions would be important, 
the underlying problems are not just about methodology and evidence; they 
would be concerned with the wider context of IQ testing and the role of particular 
modes of inquiry with respect to power relations—in this instance the 
role of “intelligence testing” within a context of racist practice and ideology. 
Hence for critical pedagogy questions such as who is making these assertions 
about the relationship between “intelligence” and “race,” why are they being 
made at this point in time, who funds this research, and who benefits from the 
promulgation of these findings are central. 
 
While Burbules and Berk avoid presenting the two traditions as binary 
opposites, this example demonstrates the different ways in which pedagogy 
is conceived. Within the critical thinking tradition, this is based on positivist 
and “unbiased” modes of reasoning and inquiry that allow different truth 
claims to be evaluated. The distinctive feature of critical pedagogy, by contrast, 
lies not simply in the process of equipping learners with the skills that enable 
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to them to think critically, but includes within this the idea that the production 
of knowledge and the identities of learners being themselves socially and 
ideologically mediated. In this sense the task is not one of seeking to be “unbiased”; 
instead we need to understand the way dominant frameworks define and 
constitute that which counts as “knowledge.” Freire argues that the educator’s 
knowledge is always inherently incomplete and therefore the “act of knowing” 
must be based on a critical dialogue between the teacher and student. What he 
is pointing to here is a way of understanding criticality as a process in which 
both the educator and the educated seek to “problematize” the basis of forms of 
existing knowledge, which could be personal and group experiences, “expert 
knowledges” based on existing research, policy, media perceptions, etc., with a 
view to looking at the way all these elements interact. 
 
This points to the way the distinction between the two traditions outlined 
by Burbules and Berk can be read at two levels—that of epistemology and that 
of pedagogical practice. In terms of epistemology, the distinction between 
critical thinking and critical pedagogy can be read as a restatement of the 
differences between Kantian and Marxist approaches. Kant’s work represents 
the beginning of classical liberal philosophy where the use of Reason acts as 
an expression of what Steutel and Spiecker have called “the autonomy of the 
individual” (2002, 63). For Kant, critical thinking is perceived as a necessary 
virtue of citizens and thus as a prerequisite for the sound operation of a society, 
which needs people who are able to participate in public debates about 
its overall direction and organization (Ibid.). By contrast Marx rejected the 
atomistic focus on “individual autonomy” as both philosophically confused 
and empirically false. He argued that as human beings are essentially social 
creatures, so social and economic theory must always engage with social totality: 
“Whenever we speak of production . . . what is meant is always . . . production 
by social individuals” (Marx 1975, 85). In other words Marx’s conception 
of people working to create a material product is the same as people producing 
and reproducing particular sets of social relations. We can thus never be outside 
of social relations, whose shape and form have a profound influence on 
the forms of knowledge that are seen to be important or unimportant. Freire’s 
conception of critical pedagogy draws on a similar understanding of the reproduction 
of social relations in schools and universities; hence their production 
of students whose “high level of intelligence” makes them fit to rule society; 
domesticated, unquestioning students whose knowledge never threatens the 
powerful; and poor “uneducable” students, excluded from participation in the 
system. 
 
On speaking and remaining silent 
 
This question of epistemology merges into the issue of the form of pedagogy. 
While there were egalitarian elements in Kant’s thinking, he sees the pursuit of 
critical thinking as largely confined to formal, traditional intellectuals—those 
who, in Socrates’s times, would have been deemed as “philosopher kings.” A 
key theme in critical pedagogy by contrast is the need for an expanded and 
more egalitarian conception of intellectuality itself. The ideas of the Italian 
Marxist Antonio Gramsci are important here since he is one of the first people 
to theorize the role of “intellectuals” in the production and reproduction 
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of power relations. Against the conventional understanding of intellectuals, 
whom Gramsci termed “traditional intellectuals,” he counterposed what he 
called “organic intellectuals,” who emerged from within and among the popular 
classes in society. The recognition of “organic intellectuals” linked together 
Gramsci’s emancipatory vision of intellectuals and the idea of proletarian 
emancipation: 
For a mass of people to be led to think coherently and in the same  
coherent fashion about the real present world is a “philosophical”  
event, far more important and “original” than the discovery by some  
philosophical “genius” of a truth, which remains the property of small  
groups of intellectuals. (Gramsci 1984, 325) 
While Paulo Freire also stands in a broadly Marxist tradition of social transformation, 
he develops this question differently from Gramsci through a focus on 
theorizing the mode of participation within the educational processes themselves. 
This expresses the way critical pedagogy seeks to foreground the impact 
of social relations of power, which could be at the levels of class, “race,” and/ 
or gender, and that act to silence those are who less powerful, in acts of what 
we might call (following Pierre Bourdieu) “symbolic violence” (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 1994, 107–108). The point here is that the capacity of individuals to 
critically evaluate different truth claims takes place on a radically uneven terrain. 
Just as Marx argued that the religiosity of oppressed workers represented 
much more than their lack of enlightenment, so for Freire the passivity of the 
so-called uneducated cannot be seen as reflecting their lack of capacity for 
critical thought. Rather, this was an inevitable consequence of their construction 
within a political economy of entitlement ; a question of who is and who 
is not allowed to speak. As he notes, oppressed people 
suffer from a duality, which has established itself in their innermost being.  
They discover that without freedom they cannot exist authentically. Yet  
although they desire authentic existence, they fear it. They are one  
and the same time themselves and the oppressor whose consciousness  
they have internalized” (Freire 1996, 30). 
For Freire, traditional didactic pedagogy produced silent, domesticated students 
for whom “learning” remained entirely separate to their consciousness 
and subjectivity, and he sought to challenge this by developing critical pedagogical 
methods that sought to give students the license to speak in their own 
voices and, in that process, develop critical insights into both themselves and 
the world they lived in. The distinction he develops is between what he calls 
“banking education” and “problem-posing education.” Within banking education, 
students are conceived of as “receptacles’ to be ‘filled’ by the teacher. 
Education thus becomes an act of depositing, in which the students are the 
depositories and the teacher is the depositor” (Freire 1996, 53). In contrast to 
this approach, Freire advocated a form of problem-based approach that sought 
to displace the traditional hierarchical model or teacher/pupil with a dialogical 
approach that enables both “the problems of human beings in their relations 
with the world [which] consists of acts of cognition, not transferals of information” 
(1996, 60–61). 
 
As the quote from Freire above suggests, critical pedagogy involves a dialectic 
process where the teacher and the student are both engaged in teaching 
each other and learning from each other. This is not to deny the teacher’s 
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knowledge, but this needs to be understood not as a private accumulation, 
but as work whose inherent social collectivity is realized through engagement 
with students. Freire’s concept of “dialogue” thus represents much more than 
the inherent value of people talking with each other; it involves a dialectical 
interchange between theory and experience. Equally it would be a mistake to 
think of critical pedagogy simply as encompassed by participatory teaching 
methods. For Freire, critical pedagogy was about the nurturance of intellectual 
capabilities not just as a tool for developing literacy and understanding, but 
also as a means of overcoming the “symbolic violence” that situates a person 
as not entitled to speak. In a book that offers one of the best accounts of Freire’s 
philosophy, Jones Irwin notes that “problematization” is so crucial because “it 
avoids fatalism and determinism, aspects of behaviour which Freire sees as 
plaguing the oppressed and their conditions as well as their possibilities for 
overcoming oppression” (2012, 60). “Speaking” in this sense is linked with the 
discovery of a capacity for agency. 
 
This idea has been developed in interesting ways by the black feminist 
writer bell hooks, who worked with Freire in the 1990s. In her book Teaching 
to Transgress hooks begins by reflecting on her own different experiences of 
pedagogical practices, the first in black-only classrooms that were based on 
an explicit basis of nurturing critical capacity, compared to being bussed into 
integrated classrooms: 
All our teachers at Booker T. Washington were black women. They  
were committed to nurturing intellect so we could become scholars,  
teachers, cultural workers—black folk who used our “minds.” We learned  
that our devotion to learning and the life of the mind was a  
counter-hegemonic act, a fundamental way to resist every strategy of  
white racist colonisation. (hooks 1994, 2) 
However upon being bussed into integrated schools, she then had to learn 
that “obedience, and not a zealous will to learn was what was expected of 
us . . . We were always and only responding and reacting to white folks” (hooks 
1994, 3–4). Hooks uses this starting point to develop an argument about the 
importance of critical pedagogy in creating a classroom in which the marginalization 
and silencing of women and black pupils was overturned. In this 
sense critical pedagogy explicitly seeks to enable a learner to move from self  
objectification — at the level of class, “race,” or gender — to being a “critically 
conscious”’ subject. McLaren and Da Silva develop this point still further, 
noting that: 
a major consideration for the development of contextual critical  
knowledge is affirming the experiences of students to the extent that  
their voices are acknowledged as an important part of the dialogue;  
but affirming these voices does not necessarily mean that the meaning  
students give to their experiences can be taken at face value, as  
if experience speaks romantically or even tragically for itself.  
The task of the critical practitioner is to provide the conditions for  
individuals to acquire a language that will enable them to  
reflect upon and shape their experiences and in certain instances transform 
those experiences. (1993, 49) 
 




The discussion throughout this chapter makes it clear that historically the ideal 
of education as a social good is inherently bound up with a concept of democratic 
citizenship. However, to come back to the present, the neoliberal model, 
which dominates the practice of universities across the globe, is based on a 
severance of this connection by promoting a narrowly instrumental notion 
of higher education. In that sense it represents a major breach with the classical 
liberal education tradition that has, until recent times, dominated the life 
of the modern university. Under this new political economy of higher education, 
students are increasingly treated not as people who are being invited 
to become members of an academic community, but rather as commodities 
acquiring a marketable value on the one hand and consumers of services on 
the other. Likewise, academic staff become less valued for their qualities as  
educationalists vested with a responsibility to nurture inquisitive critical thinkers, 
and more as “service providers.” 
 
While more traditional , socially elitist versions of academic education have 
been criticized for their lack of relevance, the new discourse of “relevance” 
now demanded of universities is one that, like the state itself, embraces a 
financially driven logic in which the demands of “the market” are paramount. 
Within this ideological context, the acquisition of knowledge and educational 
experience is presented largely as a commercial transaction, driven primarily 
for the benefit of individual students in terms of their employability in an 
increasingly ruthless labor market. As much as anything else, this undermines 
genuine criticality in universities, as open-ended educational processes are 
increasingly displaced by training the role of which is to produce new cadres 
of unquestioning domesticated students (Giroux 2007, 210). Alongside this, 
we are also seeing the managerialization of pedagogical practices whereby the 
sense of teaching as a craft and learning as a process of “drawing out” or self  
realization is undermined and replaced, rather like a fast food, by a series of 
standardized prepacked curricula. Elsewhere we have described this is as analogous 
to a Sat-Nav educational experience (Cowden and Singh 2013) where 
students are increasingly being taught what to think, but not how to think 
(Canaan and Shumar 2008). Just as universities as institutions are becoming 
increasingly defined by the demands of the financial markets to which they 
are becoming ever more beholden, so also the student experience will come to 
be defined by cycles of debt to which students are bonded (Cowden and Singh 
2013; McGettigan 2013). It is thus what we call the “social context of criticality” 
or this sense of criticality as a practice that we see as most threatened by the 
neoliberalization of education. 
 
The full consequences of this are still to emerge, but we see already the emergence 
of a dangerous paradox. The lives of people across the globe are increasingly 
beset by deep underlying problems that urgently require new thinking, 
such as increasing ecological crisis resulting from global climate change; escalating 
social problems that are almost entirely a consequence of a growing 
chasm of social inequalities, both within and between nations; multiple forms 
of violence and conflict, particularly those associated with gender, class, and 
ethnic/communal divisions; and the rise of authoritarian religious fundamentalism 
and new forms of racialized nationalism. If the crises brought about 
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by what David Harvey has called neoliberalism’s “accumulation by dispossession” 
(2003, 158) are to be resolved in ways that do not destroy the social 
bonds that make societies viable and sustainable, we urgently need to nurture 
a socially engaged capacity for critical thinking. For all their problems, there is 
no escaping the fact that universities are unique in their capacity to contribute 
to this process. In the current climate it is not an exaggeration to assert that 
the defense of genuinely critical educational spaces is a defense of the idea of 
criticality itself. Moreover, in the face of the transforming of the mission of 
universities from democratic public institutions into businesses, it is equally 
important that new critical educational spaces, both physical and virtual, are 
developed outside the institutional structures. It is in this sense that we have 
sought to argue that critical pedagogy provides a means of nurturing criticality 
among students both as an intellectual pursuit and a social practice. And 
it is in the work of Paulo Freire that we see the most cogent articulation of a 
pedagogical project that is capable of enabling students to realize a deeper ethical 
dimension to learning and education, without which we are impoverished 
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